Equity Basis Selection in Allocation Environments: An Empirical Analysis by Aadland, David & Koplin, Van
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 36(2):229–241
Copyright 2011 Western Agricultural Economics Association
Equity Basis Selection in Allocation Environments:
An Empirical Analysis
David Aadland and Van Kolpin
Successful formation and long-term stability of cooperative ventures is often linked to the
perceived fairness of the cost and resource allocations that these ventures employ. Indeed, the lack
of a consensus over what basis should be used for gauging equitable allocation can undermine the
prospects for collaboration. We use irrigation cost sharing as a context for examining the equity
basis selections of cooperative ventures that successfully form and endure. Our analysis reveals
that these selections are explained by features of the cooperative environment and inequities in
the derived beneﬁts from the irrigation water.
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Introduction
Many cooperative ventures, whether they are simple business partnerships or international
collaborations, innately support a variety of alternative bases for gauging the “equitable” distribution
of costs and resources. Consider the classic airport problem in which airlines share the costs of
common landing strips (Littlechild and Owen, 1973). In this context, it is natural to use either
the set of airlines, ﬂights, passengers, or even revenues as a basis for equitable cost distribution.
This multiplicity of logically compelling equity bases is a feature common to many cost-sharing
applications and can prove to be a signiﬁcant obstacle to the formation and long-term stability of
collaborative agreements. The traditional cost-sharing literature, however, examines the allocation
of costs across elements of a given equity basis. Although this is certainly a problem of considerable
interest, it does not speak to the issue of why one equity basis is selected over others in any particular
application. The goal of this paper is to offer a theoretical motivation for equity basis selections
observed in practice and to empirically examine the extent to which observed selections can be
predicted in a theoretically consistent fashion by features of the cooperative environment.
Much of the theoretical cost-sharing literature employs axiomatic principles on a given equity
basis to derive a unique cost-sharing rule. Alternative rules can be derived by appealing to different
sets of principles regarding appropriate/equitable cost sharing. For instance, costs may be distributed
across an equity basis in accordance with average cost sharing, serial cost sharing, the nucleolus, the
Shapley value, etc. Moulin (2002) presents a survey of popular alternatives. Despite this ﬂexibility,
the traditional axiomatic approach operates under the basic premise that the relevant equity basis
is exogenously given and determination of the “ideal” cost-sharing rule depends solely on the
cost-sharing game’s mathematical structure. As noted above, applications often present a variety
of compelling equity bases, not just one. We argue that features of the cooperative environment
that affect the distribution of beneﬁts, but not the shared costs, may inﬂuence equity basis selection
through a collective desire to administer cost sharing over a “level playing ﬁeld.” Toward that end,
we introduce the beneﬁt inequity principle, which posits that the greater are the differences in the
We thank Myles Watts, Gary Brester, and three anonymous referees. Their thoughtful and constructive comments led to
numerous improvements in our paper’s content and presentation. We also thank Chris Kennedy for his assistance in creating
the GIS map.
Review coordinated by Myles J. Watts.230 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Figure 1. Montana Counties
Notes: Stillwater County is shaded dark, Carbon County is shaded light, all other counties are white.
pre-tax (before cost-share deduction) beneﬁts realized by elements of a given equity basis, the less
likelythatbasiswillbeselectedtoadministercostsharingandassessfairness.Ourempiricalanalysis
tests the efﬁcacy of this axiom as a guiding force in the practical selection of equity bases.
We use irrigation cost sharing in two neighboring counties of Montana, USA, as a context for
our study. Figure 1 presents a graphical depiction of these counties - Carbon and Stillwater - within
the state of Montana. Figure 2 depicts the distribution of irrigated lands within Carbon and Stillwater
counties. This context is well suited for our study of equity basis selection, thanks in part to the close
geographic and social proximity of the sample. This closeness makes it less likely that unobserved
variation in cultural conventions, which may in turn inﬂuence cooperative decision making, will
bias our estimates. Indeed, Young (1994) notes that equity is “strongly shaped by cultural values,
by precedent, and the speciﬁc types of goods and burdens being distributed.” Another compelling
feature of our data is that the cost-sharing practices observed on the irrigation ditches in this region
have proven to be remarkably stable.1 Moreover, from the time that these ditches were ﬁrst formed,
irrigators have been highly motivated to adopt sharing procedures that minimize the prospects for
dispute. For instance, Teele (1900) highlights a statement of expenses for a Montana ditch in the
early 1890’s and notes that the amount of money invested in legal expenses was four times that of
ditch maintenance and operation combined.
The irrigation ditches in our sample share a common physical structure. The “main” ditch
begins at the headgate, which diverts water from the ditch’s source river/stream, and continues in a
sequential path through both users’ and non-user’s property. Costs for private ditches that branch off
the main ditch are covered by the respective owners and are not shared by the group as a whole.
Thus the shared costs are those pertaining to the headgate and main ditch, examples of which
include headgate repair, silt and debris removal, and repair of deteriorating earthen ditch banks.
The ditches are used to irrigate various cash crops (e.g., alfalfa hay, sugar beets, barley, and corn),
water livestock, and irrigate pastures, lawns, and gardens.
1 Only one ditch in our sample had users who indicated there had been changes made to cost-sharing practices in the
recent past. Private communications with irrigators also indicated that ditches have often employed the same practices for
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Figure 2. Irrigated Land in Carbon and Stillwater Counties
Notes: Irrigated land in Carbon and Stillwater is shaded. Map is constructed from GIS data provided by the Water Resources
Division of the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation.
Our data set is constructed from a combination of state and federal sources, as well as our own
survey efforts. The data support the conclusion that the beneﬁt inequity principle serves as a guiding
force in equity basis selection. In particular, the coefﬁcients of our empirical model have signs
consistent with this principle and our independent variables exhibit considerable explanatory power.
Although our paper may be the ﬁrst to empirically address equity basis selection, it is far from
the ﬁrst to use water resources as a context for economic analysis. For instance, predating our
paper by over a century, Teele (1900) examined unsettled water rights and ineffective matching
of labor and capital as impediments to agricultural development in the western United States. In
regards to game-theoretic analysis, engineers and economic consultants for the Tennessee Valley
Authority in the 1930’s examined the allocation of shared costs and independently derived solutions
closely resembling those formally constructed in the cooperative game theory literature many years
later (Strafﬁn and Heaney, 1981). Collective behavior in the context of water resource sharing
also plays a primary role in the classic Ostrom (1990), which provides an in-depth empirical and
theoretical analysis of the evolution of community institutions that govern various common pool
resources. Dayton-Johnson (2000) uses irrigation data from Mexico to examine the joint decision of
resource (water) and cost sharing. The paper’s empirical analysis concludes that increased economic
inequality leads to a decreased likelihood of both water and costs being shared equally across
all users. Although the Mexican irrigation ditches in the Dayton-Johnson sample service many
more users than the Montana ditches of our sample (an average of 125 households versus 7) and232 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
the Dayton-Johnson data set is not partitioned by equity basis, the impact of economic inequality
nonetheless supports the beneﬁt inequity principle.
Axiomatic Motivation
Relationship to the Traditional Axiomatic Methodology
Much of the theoretical cost-sharing literature adopts essentially the same methodology as that
pursued in the creation of the bargaining solution (Nash, 1950) or the Shapley value (Shapley,
1953). In general, this methodology formulates a mathematical abstraction of the universe of all
environments under consideration, identiﬁes desirable properties of a “solution” deﬁned within
this universe, and then demonstrates that these properties characterize a unique solution or class
of solutions. For instance, the “Shapley program” considers the universe of all TU (transferable
utility) games, deﬁnes a solution as a value operator, and then demonstrates that the Shapley value
is the only solution to satisfy the anonymity, additivity, and dummy axioms.
The approach adopted in our paper differs from that outlined above in several respects. First,
each irrigation ditch in our universe of cost-sharing environments has not one, but three distinct
“populations” that can serve as the “player” set over which equity is assessed and costs are
distributed - namely, the populations of: 1) irrigators using the ditch, 2) acres irrigated by the ditch,
and3)watersharesdistributedontheditch;wherea“watershare”representsashareofstockinditch
ownership and a claim to a share of the ditch’s water capacity. Because each of these populations
provides a different basis for equity assessment, we refer to these populations generally as equity
bases and speciﬁcally as the per capita basis, per acre basis, and per water-share basis respectively.2
A second dimension where our approach differs from traditional treatments of cost sharing is
that we consider the possibility that features of the cooperative environment, in particular those that
have no effect on the costs to be distributed, may inﬂuence equity basis selection. Ditch maintenance
costs are the only values subject to redistribution in our setting. A traditional approach would dictate
not only that the equity basis be taken as exogenously given, but also that the universe of cost-
sharing games for this equity basis should be characterized solely in terms of those parameters
that impact shared costs. We depart from the traditional approach and hypothesize that the beneﬁts
accruing across the ditch may inﬂuence the equity basis embraced even when these beneﬁts are not
themselves subject to redistribution.
A ﬁnal dimension of difference in our approach is that we do not use axiomatic principles to
identify a unique cost-sharing rule that should be employed in a framework that is assumed to
perfectly reﬂect the real world. Instead, we use the cost-sharing procedures in practice to determine
if the data support the hypothesis that equity basis selection is guided by axiomatic principles,
speciﬁcally the beneﬁt inequity principle.
The irrigation cost-sharing environments under consideration are characterized by the: 1)
maintenance costs incurred on the ditch, 2) population of users that have access to the ditch (the
per capita basis), 3) population of acres serviced by the ditch (the per acre basis), 4) population
of water shares distributed across users of the ditch (the per water-share basis), and 5) beneﬁts
that accrue to these populations, which often vary by the type and scale of water use. Our paper
maintains a tight focus on examining the manner in which the underlying environment may impact
equity basis selection. Readers seeking a detailed discussion of how the cooperative environment
may affect the manner in which costs are distributed across a given equity basis are encouraged to
2 In principle, additional equity bases could also be considered. As we did not detect the use of alternative equity bases
in our sample, we restrict our attention to per capita, per acre, and per water-share bases. Note also that our terminology
should not be interpreted as indicating that costs are necessarily shared equally between all elements of the respective basis.
Differential treatment of basis elements can be induced by their relative location on the ditch.Aadland and Kolpin Equity Basis Selection 233
consult Aadland and Kolpin (2004).3 Those interested in axiomatic characterizations of the average
and serial irrigation cost-sharing rules given a ﬁxed equity basis and without consideration for the
inﬂuence of environmental features should consult Aadland and Kolpin (1998).
An Equity Basis Selection Principle
A key axiom underlying our analysis is the beneﬁt inequity principle. The essential idea underlying
this principle is that when costs, and not beneﬁts, are subject to redistribution, there may be a
fundamental pressure to administer cost sharing over a “level playing ﬁeld.” That is, an increase
in the pre-tax beneﬁt inequity attributed to any particular equity basis may imply a diminished set of
circumstances in which that basis will be selected to administer cost sharing and assess fairness.
The beneﬁt inequity principle dictates that greater inequalities in the pre-tax (before cost-share
deduction) beneﬁts realized by elements of a given equity basis will reduce the set of circumstances
in which the given equity basis will be adopted.4
Readers may note that our formulation of the beneﬁt inequity principle does not specify a precise
functional relationship between the beneﬁt inequality realized across bases and the equity basis
actually adopted. Instead, it merely states that this relationship is decreasing, ceteris paribus, in
the beneﬁt inequality attributed to the given basis and, thus, represents a monotonicity principle.
This axiomatic feature enables our data to speak to where these lines should be drawn, rather than
imposing rigid speciﬁcations that may or may not be supported by the data. It is also worth noting
that the tendencies toward “inequity avoidance” reﬂected by the beneﬁt inequity principle need
not necessarily be generated by a direct preference for fairness.5 Cost-sharing participants are well
aware that their situation is one of repeated interaction both in terms of irrigation and the local
community. Consistent with the “transaction cost” motivations espoused in Allen and Lueck (1993),
the apparent preference for equity can also be an artifact of a desire to avoid the costs of conﬂict
fueled by perceived inequity.
The Data
Data Sources
The cost-sharing agreements within our sample represent a set of stable, yet informal, conventions
that are “understood” by respective ditch users. As these conventions are not documented in publicly
available sources, we surveyed users to obtain information regarding their cost-sharing procedures
and the circumstances surrounding their use. Our survey efforts revealed that there are three bases
over which costs are shared in our sample - the set of irrigators, the set of irrigated acres, and the set
of water shares. As previously noted, we shall refer to these bases as the per capita, per acre, and per
water-share bases.
3 Aadland and Kolpin (2004) examine the collective choice between average and serial cost sharing. In the context of
irrigation cost sharing, average cost sharing dictates that all members of a given equity basis share the costs of every
maintenance project, whereas serial cost sharing requires only those equity basis members located downstream of a
maintenance project to share in its costs. “Excess demand protection” is shown to be a key factor in determining which
of these procedures are adopted in practice.
4 To state this principle more formally, let the universe of all circumstances for a given equity basis selection environment
be characterized by D  Y, where D is the space of all pre-tax (before cost share deduction) beneﬁt inequity proﬁles for the
candidate equity bases and Y is the space deﬁned by all relevant factors other than beneﬁt inequity. The beneﬁt inequity
principle dictates that if d and d0 are two elements of D that differ only in the pre-tax beneﬁt inequity of equity basis i, then
Yi(d0)Yi(d) whenever d0 has a larger pre-tax inequity for basis i than that of d; where for each x 2D;Yi(x)=fy 2
Yj(x;y) induces selection of equity basis ig.
5 However, there is an ample literature indicating that equity does indeed play a signiﬁcant role in the preferences of some
people and that the existence of such individuals can have broader implications for the overall economic systems in which
they interact. See, for instance, Rabin (1993) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999).234 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
WemailedtheoriginalsurveyinMarch1998toeveryindividualwithawater rightinCarbonand
Stillwater counties of Montana. Names and address of the individuals were provided by the Water
Resource Division of the Montana Department of Natural Resources and Conservation (DNRC).
We then followed the original survey by mailing a shorter postcard survey in November 1999 to
increase response rates. The two surveys yielded a total of 270 useable individual responses across
98 irrigation ditches in Carbon and Stillwater counties, an average of approximately 2.75 responses
per ditch. These 98 ditches service approximately 2,840 individual parcels, which comprise nearly
150,000 acres of irrigated land. Fourteen ditches were then excluded from the analysis because
either: (a) the DNRC records indicate a single-user ditch or (b) respondents indicated that costs
were distributed in a manner in which individuals bore the full responsibility for maintaining the
portion of the ditch passing through their respective property (in which case one is unable to draw a
distinction between the three prospective equity bases as each leads to the same ﬁnal cost share for
the corresponding user). Our ﬁnal sample therefore includes 84 ditches that can be associated with
either a per capita, per acre, or per water-share rule.
The reported equity basis on any particular ditch was generally consistent across respondents.
Of the 84 ditches in our sample, 62 ditches exhibited no disagreement between survey respondents
over the equity basis employed on their ditch. For the remaining 22 ditches, the reported equity
basis was not perfectly consistent across respondents but typically involved a single dissenting
respondent. This might be expected given that cost-sharing arrangements, and farmland contracts
more generally as documented in Allen and Lueck (1992), tend to be informal oral agreements.
Apparent inconsistencies in the equity basis that ditch users “understand” to be in use were resolved
by assigning to each ditch the basis stated by the majority of its respondents and, if a tie were to
occur (there were six ties), the most common basis in the overall data set was selected to represent
the equity basis “of record.”6 We experimented with other methods for handling the reported
inconsistencies; results are brieﬂy discussed below.
In addition to our survey, we relied on several other sources to construct our data set. First,
the DNRC provided information on the location and size for the parcels of land serviced by the
irrigation ditches in our sample, as well as the primary use for the water (Water Resource Division of
the Montana DNRC, 2002).7 Second, we used the Soil Surveys for Carbon and Stillwater counties
(Parker, 1975; Parker, Decker, and Jackson, 1980) to derive estimates of the irrigated and non-
irrigated productivity of the land served by a ditch. These estimates were, in turn, used to formulate a
measureofthebeneﬁtsbestowedbyaccesstotheirrigationditch.Finally,weusehigh-qualityspatial
climate maps produced by the Oregon Climate Service to generate detailed measures of expected
rainfall on each parcel of land serviced by the ditches in our sample, another factor impacting the
incremental beneﬁts of irrigation (Oregon Climate Service, 2002).
Econometric Variables
We now turn to the speciﬁcation of the variables used in our econometric analysis. Because we only
consider three equity bases (i.e., per capita, per acre, and per water share), it sufﬁces to consider two
dependent variables - PC and PA. PC is a ditch-level binary variable that is equal to one if costs are
shared on a per capita basis and zero if an alternative basis is employed. Similarly, PA is a ditch-level
binary variable that equals one if costs are shared on a per acre basis and zero otherwise. Given that
there are three bases that appear in our sample, it follows that if PC=PA=0, then costs are distributed
on a per water-share basis.
6 Alternatively, one can simply think of this equity basis as the one a majority of users perceive to be in use. That informal
agreements may lead to conﬂicting perceptions regarding the equity basis effectively employed is hardly surprising. Indeed,
even cooperative arrangements that include only two individuals, such as a marriage, can often lead to persistently divergent
perceptions regarding agreements that are “understood” to be in place.
7 Examples of primary use include crop irrigation, watering of livestock, and lawn/garden use.Aadland and Kolpin Equity Basis Selection 235
The motivation behind the selection of our explanatory variables follows Tang (1992), which
notes that “The size of the irrigated area, the number of cultivators involved, the distribution of
wealth, and the social and cultural differences among cultivators affect their coordination costs
and their abilities to develop and sustain institutional arrangements that can solve their problems.”
We identify a small number of such factors in the available data that may explain the institutional
selection of our speciﬁc interest, that of equity basis selection. Each directly or indirectly contributes
to (pre-tax) beneﬁt inequality within our three equity bases.
The ﬁrst such factor is SIZE, which is deﬁned from both a per capita and a per acre perspective.
The per capita variant of SIZE is deﬁned to be the number of users on the ditch.8 In the majority
of the cases, we have precise information regarding the number of users. However, some ditches
are incorporated and ﬁled with a single water right in the name of the ditch corporation rather than
separate water rights for each user. As a result, we are unable to calculate per capita versions of the
explanatory variables for the incorporated ditches in our sample. To handle these missing data, we
replace the missing observations with a zero and add an additional dummy variable that captures
whether information regarding the number of users was available.9 The per acre variant of SIZE is
deﬁned to be the total number of irrigated acres on the ditch.
The second factor is ATYPICAL, which is again considered from either a per capita or a per acre
perspective. The per capita variant of ATYPICAL represents the fraction of ditch users that employ
irrigation water in a nonstandard way. We used the Montana DNRC data to make this determination.
A user is said to be pursuing nonstandard use if their water right is designated as primarily for
something other than crop irrigation or if they irrigate a parcel of land that is less than 1/2 acre
- a proxy for someone who is using the land for purposes other than farming or for very small
operations. Similarly, the per acre variant of ATYPICAL is deﬁned to be the fraction of irrigated
acres that employ water in a nonstandard way, i.e., used for something other than crop irrigation or
belonging to a parcel less than 1/2 acre in size.
The per capita variant of TOWN is a variable that represents the fraction of ditch users that
irrigate property within a one-mile radius of a town center. This variable serves as a proxy for
the share of landowners who have land that may be particularly suitable for something other than
agricultural use. It also serves to capture beneﬁts derived from close proximity to city services and
supplies. The per acre variant of TOWN is the fraction of irrigated acres within a one-mile radius of
a town center.
SD represents a measure of variation in the pre-tax beneﬁts accruing to equity basis elements on
a given ditch. When the focus is on the per capita basis, one can think of the total acreage irrigated
by a user as capturing a measure of the pretax beneﬁts accruing to this user. The per capita variant
of SD is then deﬁned as the standard deviation of acres irrigated by users on the ditch. When the
focus is on the per acre basis, note that larger parcels of land will tend to facilitate larger beneﬁts
per acre. Indeed, there is a smaller percentage of land lost to fence lines and natural boundaries, less
movement and setup costs of machinery per unit of crop yield, etc. To capture this effect, each acre
is assigned a value equal to the parcel size to which it belongs. The per acre variant of SD is then
deﬁned as the standard deviation of these values across each irrigated acre on the ditch.
The ﬁnal two variables are factors that inﬂuence the incremental economic returns associated
with irrigated land. RAIN is a variable that captures the minimum expected rainfall on a given
ditch. That is, each parcel of land has an expected level of rainfall and RAIN represents the smallest
expected rainfall attributed to any parcel serviced by the ditch in question. We focus on the minimum
expected rainfall because: (a) it serves as a proxy for the risk associated with low levels of rainfall,
8 Depending on context, we focus on either the per capita basis or the per acre basis. We do not directly use per water
share as a basis because this is tantamount to noting the absence of focus on either per capita or per acre bases.
9 The dummy-variable approach for handling missing data was originally suggested by Cohen and Cohen (1983).
However, it has been shown to provide biased estimates of the coefﬁcients in certain circumstances and is no longer widely
accepted. Allison (2001) argues that listwise deletion is the preferred alternative out of the conventional methods for handling
missing data. For completeness, we estimate the econometric model using both methods. The results are robust to both
methods and are brieﬂy discussed in Section 4.236 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
and (b) some of the ditches have ﬁelds located near mountainous regions that receive considerably
more precipitation than the tillable ﬁelds served by the ditch. In such cases, the expected rainfall that
the OCS data attributes to some ﬁelds is biased upwards relative to expected rainfall elsewhere on the
ditch. Our speciﬁcation of the RAIN variable moderates this bias. YIELD RATIO is deﬁned as the
ratio of the expected alfalfa yield (the most common crop) on irrigated land relative to the expected
alfalfa yield on the same land when one instead uses dryland farming methods.10 The variation in
soil types, steepness, and elevation across our sample leads to variation in YIELD RATIO. This
variable was constructed using the Carbon and Stillwater Soil Surveys.
Table 1 reports the deﬁnitions of the variables and various summary statistics. Notice that the
sample is unbalanced in the direction of per water-share rules, with the precise distribution being per
water-share (n=53), per capita (n=19) and per acre (n=12) rules. Focusing on the user-deﬁned
version of the variables, there is an average of approximately seven users with most living outside
town. There is substantial variation in irrigated acres across users on each ditch with the average of
SD equal to 73 acres. The ATYPICAL variable indicates that most ditches are comprised of larger
users who are irrigating crops - only six ditches have users who are irrigating small acreage or are
using the water for stock or domestic purposes. There is also substantial variation in RAIN (with
the minimum rainfall varying between 108 and 238 millimeters - 4.25 to 9.37 inches - per growing
season) and in YIELD RATIO (with a minimum of 1.4 and a maximum of 7.0).
Econometric Analysis
In this section, we introduce the econometric models and the estimation methods. The primary goal
of this section is to investigate whether features of the cost-sharing environment can explain the
choice of equity basis and whether this explanatory power is consistent with the beneﬁt inequity
principle. In particular, we seek to determine if environmental features that increase the perceived
inequityafﬁliatedwithanequitybasiswilldecreasethelikelihoodofthisequitybasisbeingselected.
However, we also recognize the fact that the inherent simplicity and transparency of a per capita
basis may be appealing in its own right. We capture this appeal by adopting a two-stage model
econometric model. Stage 1 represents a choice between the relatively transparent per capita equity
basis and the somewhat more complex alternatives - the per acre and per water-share bases. Stage 2
represents the choice to be made between the per acre and per water-share bases after the per capita
basis option has been eliminated.
Probit Models
We consider an irrigation ditch as the unit of observation, which is indexed from i=1;:::;n. In our
ﬁrst model, we restrict irrigators to select a per capita basis or to select from the set of all other





i is a latent variable measuring the propensity of irrigators on ditch i to collectively
choose the per capita basis over the alternatives, Xi is a column vector of the per capita basis
explanatory variables for ditch i detailed in section 3, b is a column vector of coefﬁcients, and
ei is a normally distributed error term with mean zero. The Xi vector includes per capita versions
of SIZE, ATYPICAL, TOWN, and SD, each of which may impact pre-tax beneﬁt inequities for the
irrigators themselves.
10 Alfalfa hay is not the only crop grown in our sample, nor is it necessarily the most proﬁtable choice. It is, however,
the one crop for which we could obtain estimated yields for both irrigated and dryland farming techniques on every soil
type present in the region and thus YIELD RATIO serves as a useful proxy for productivity differentials between farming
techniques.Aadland and Kolpin Equity Basis Selection 237
Table 1. Variable Deﬁnitions and Descriptive Statistics
Variable Deﬁnition
Statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Sample Size
PC 1 if cost-sharing rule is speciﬁed on a
per capita basis, 0 otherwise
0:23 0:42 0:00 1:00 84
PA 1 if cost-sharing rule is speciﬁed on a
per acre basis, 0 otherwise
0:14 0:35 0:00 1:00 84
PWS 1 if cost-sharing rule is speciﬁed on a
per water-share basis, 0 otherwise
0:63 0:49 0:00 1:00 84
SIZE Number of irrigators (acres)
7:38 6:78 2:00 33:00 63
(1507:50) (2796:30) (18:80) (21563:50) (65)
ATYPICAL
Fraction of users (acres) using
water for stock/domestic
purposes or on ﬁelds less than
one half acre
0:02 0:06 0:00 0:33 63
(0:00) (0:01) (0:00) (0:05) (65)
TOWN
Fraction of users (acres) within a
mile radius of town center
0:13 0:29 0:00 1:00 63
(0:07) (0:17) (0:00) (1:00) (65)
SD
Standard deviation of irrigated
acres across all users (standard
deviation of parcel size across all
acres)
73:13 64:78 3:19 288:88 63
(48:10) (36:20) (1:81) (189:47) (65)
RAIN Minimum rainfall (millimeters) on a
ditch parcel during the growing
season (May through August)
190:48 30:74 108:44 238:39 65
YIELD RATIO Ratio of average yield on irrigated to
non-irrigated ﬁelds
2:27 1:17 1:40 7:00 65
Notes: The n = 63 sample sizes reﬂect variables that can only be measured for unincorporated ditches. The n = 65 sample sizes reﬂect
variables that are used to distinguish between PA and PWS equity bases. Towns under consideration include Absarokee, Bridger, Columbus,
Fromberg, Joliet, Red Lodge, and Roberts.
In stage 2, ditches that did not select the per capita equity basis then decide between per acre and




where j indexes all ditches that did not choose the per capita equity basis in stage one, PA
j is a latent
variable measuring the propensity to choose the per acre basis over the per water-share basis, Zj is a
column vector of per acre basis explanatory variables for ditch j, g is a column vector of coefﬁcients,
and vj is a mean-zero, normally distributed error term. The vector Zj includes per acre versions of
SIZE, ATYPICAL, TOWN, and SD, along with RAIN and YIELD RATIO, which are also thought
to impact the pre-tax per acre beneﬁts realized from irrigation.
Equations (1) and (2) are then used to form the necessary probabilities and associated likelihood
functions. Estimation requires nonlinear optimization techniques to generate parameter estimates
and the associated marginal effects (Greene, 2008).11 Robust standard errors are calculated to
account for possible model misspeciﬁcation.
11 The estimation was carried out in NLOGIT version 4.0.238 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
Table 2. Probit Estimation Results: Choice of Equity Basis for Irrigation Cost-Sharing Rules
Variable
Stage #1. PC vs. PA/PWS Stage #2. PA vs. PWS









Constant 0:68 0:44  1:26 2:98
SIZE  0:03 0:04  0:01    0:002 0:001  1:40e-3  
ATYPICAL  9:74 3:69  1:98    123:53 66:88  1:04  
TOWN 2:29 0:83 0:47 + 2:90 2:06 0:02 +
SD  0:02 0:01  0:004    0:03 0:02  2:30e-4  
RAIN 0:01 0:01 7:80e-3 +
YIELD RATIO 0:27 0:17 2:20e-3 +
LR Statistic 31.74*** 25.39***













PC Ditches 19 10 (53%) 15 (79%)
PA Ditches 12
60 (92%) 60 (92%)
12 6 (50%) 6 (50%)
PWS Ditches 53 53 50 (94%) 52 (98%)
All Ditches 84 70 (83%) 75 (89%) 65 56 (86%) 58 (89%)
Notes: The marginal effects (ME) are computed using the sample means. (*), (**) and (***) indicate signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level,
respectively. P-values for the coefﬁcient estimates are based on one-tailed tests. PC = Per Capita; PA = Per Acre; PWS = Per Water-Share; LR
= Likelihood Ratio; MS = Maximum Score Estimator. SIZE, ATYPICAL, TOWN and SD are deﬁned with respect to users (acres) when the
dependent variable is PC (PA). The coefﬁcient on the missing-data dummy variable in stage #1 is not shown.
Discussion of the Results
The estimation results are presented in table 2. Overall, the model has signiﬁcant explanatory power
(likelihood ratio statistic is 31.74 and signiﬁcant at the 1% level) and is able to correctly predict 83%
(70 of the 84) of the equity bases. The maximum score (MS) estimator, a semi-parametric estimator
that directly maximizes the number of correct predictions, predicts 75 of the 84 ditches. We highlight
several salient features from the coefﬁcient estimates and marginal effects.
First, the signiﬁcant determinants of the per capita basis are ATYPICAL, TOWN, and SD. All
else equal, larger values of SIZE, ATYPICAL, and SD are correlated with greater differences in the
beneﬁts realized by irrigators on the ditch and thus the beneﬁt inequity principle would suggest there
is pressure to adopt an alternative to a per capita equity basis. We expect that users near town will
tend to be more uniform in the beneﬁts received from ditch access and, therefore, smaller values
of TOWN suggest a pressure to adopt an alternative to a per capita equity basis. These priors are
supported by the econometric results - large rural ditches with atypical users and greater variation in
irrigated acres are less likely to choose the per capita equity basis. The coefﬁcients of ATYPICAL,
TOWN, and SD are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
We highlight the marginal effects for two of these variables. All else equal, if the fraction of
individuals near a town increases from 0.25 to 0.75, the probability of choosing the per capita basis
increases by 23 percentage points. Likewise, an increase in SD of 50 acres decreases the probability
of choosing the per capita basis by 20 percentage points, respectively. All the coefﬁcients in the PC
equation have expected signs - ditches in town have an increased chance of using the per capita basis;
while ditches with atypical users and greater variation in irrigated acres are less likely to employ the
per capita basis.
When choosing between a per acre and a per water-share basis, users are assumed to appeal
to per acre counterparts of the explanatory variables: SIZE, ATYPICAL, TOWN and SD, as wellAadland and Kolpin Equity Basis Selection 239
as RAIN and YIELD RATIO which proxy the economic returns to each irrigated acre. We expect
that higher values for SIZE and ATYPICAL are likely to be associated with greater variation in the
use and quality of the land, both of which suggest greater variation in the beneﬁts received from
irrigating a given acre. As such, the beneﬁt inequity principle would tend to decrease the chance
that a per acre basis is chosen. Conversely, we expect that land clustered near a town will be more
uniform in both its quality and use, which in turn leads to a greater likelihood of the per acre basis.
Therefore, the coefﬁcient on TOWN is expected to be positive.
Recall that the per acre variant of SD is measured as the standard deviation of parcel size
across each irrigated acre on an irrigation ditch. All else equal, we expect larger parcels to be
more efﬁcient due to fewer natural boundaries and fences, which allow for economies of scale in
grazing or farming. Larger values of SD, therefore, imply greater variation in the productivity of
each irrigated acre and a reduced likelihood that the per acre basis will be adopted. Finally, RAIN
and YIELD RATIO serve as proxies for the variation in beneﬁts received by each irrigated acre.
Ample rainfall tends to lessen the incremental per acre beneﬁts of irrigation, reduces the variation
in per acre beneﬁts, and makes the per acre basis more likely. A higher YIELD RATIO implies a
larger proportional difference between irrigation and dry-land farming techniques, which suggests
an increased incentive to employ the best possible irrigation/farming practices. As consequence, we
expect the incremental beneﬁts of irrigation to be more uniform with higher YIELD RATIO. In light
of the beneﬁt inequity principle, this suggests a positive relationship between YIELD RATIO and
the likelihood of per acre basis being adopted.
All the coefﬁcient estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level except for RAIN
and have signs consistent with the discussion above. The likelihood ratio statistic is 25.39 and




Cooperative environments are frequently endowed with multiple prospective bases for assessing
the “fairness” of allocation. In the case of our shared irrigation cost environments, per capita, per
acre, and per water-share bases are each used. Rather than simply taking equity basis selections as
given, we explore whether parameters of the cooperative environment can be used to explain these
selections and whether they are consistent with axiomatic principles of collective behavior.
Our results show that features of the cooperative environment are indeed capable of explaining
equity basis selection. Using a sample of 84 cost-sharing irrigation ditches, we demonstrate
that environmental features enjoy substantial explanatory power in determining the equity basis
embraced in practice. This explanatory power is consistent with the beneﬁt inequity principle
- that is, greater pre-tax beneﬁt inequity across the elements of an equity basis is a deterrent
for its selection. As such, our empirical results are also supportive of an axiomatic approach to
cost-allocation applications. We consider the empirical results in our paper as a promising initial
investigation into the selection of equity bases in allocation environments, but acknowledge that
additional studies using larger data sets in a wider array of cost-sharing contexts are needed.
12 The empirical results represent a robust relationship between environmental parameters and the observed equity basis
selection. We experimented with several alternative explanatory variables and various deﬁnitions of the current explanatory
variables. For instance, we examined measures of the slope, roughness, and elevation of the land; ditch length; alternative
threshold values for ATYPICAL and TOWN; alternative measures of acre variation such as the absolute difference between
smallest and largest users, and a GINI index; rainfall and yield variation; imputation of missing SIZE observations; and self-
reported variation in water usage, to name a few. We also estimated the models on restricted samples that deleted ditches
with missing data and ditches with signiﬁcant disagreement on the perceived cost-sharing rule. The coefﬁcients from these
various speciﬁcations and samples exhibited the expected signs and the models continued to explain a signiﬁcant amount of
the variation in the dependent variables. Results are available upon request.240 August 2011 Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
In addition to the econometric results, previous research and direct statements from the irrigators
indicate that equity and conﬂict avoidance are important determinants in the choice of the equity
basis. For example, Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Toler et al. (2009) argue that
economic agents prefer equitable arrangements, while Allen and Lueck (1993) argue that agents
seek to avoid conﬂict fueled by perceptions of inequity. Respondents to our own survey also indicate
a general concern for fairness and conﬂict avoidance. Comments include statements such as:
 “If it [cost-sharing rule] ain’t broke, don’t ﬁx it. It ain’t broke.”
 “The old methods have worked for many years and are well understood by all.”
This sentiment is also supported by responses to a question from our survey that was designed for
other purposes and was not used in the present analysis. This question asked why the current cost-
sharing method continued to be practiced. The majority (85%) of respondents selected “fairness” as
being an important reason, more so than any other option.
In closing, we note that an important ﬁrst step in the forging of stable and mutually beneﬁcial
cooperative agreements is the selection of an appropriate basis for equity assessment. To the extent
that choices serving as the foundation for successful collaborations in the past can be expected
to support successful collaboration in the future, our analysis can be viewed as providing some
guidance on the best way to select such a basis. For the speciﬁc case of irrigation cost-sharing, our
econometric model and features of a prospective irrigation ditch can be used to provide an indication
of which equity basis selection is most inclined to lead to a successful collaboration. For cost-
sharing projects more generally, our results demonstrate the usefulness of identifying environmental
features that impact pre-tax beneﬁt inequality across elements of candidate equity bases. Data from
collaborative successes in the past can then be used to identify an appropriate equity basis selection
for collaborations yet to be undertaken.
[Received November 2009; ﬁnal revision received June 2011.]
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